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Abstract 
This paper responds to the argument that while Fair Trade governance might increase 
short-term welfare, it reduces long-term development prospects by discouraging 
diversification and structural change. Even though it is agreed that lower value 
sectors, such as commodity agriculture, are unlikely to offer a long-term solution to 
global income inequalities, the importance of their short- and medium-term 
contributions cannot be ignored by analysis. Furthermore, critics have evaluated Fair 
Trade governance against the benchmark of perfect market organisation. However, 
given the realities of the developing world, dismantling Fair Trade abandons poor 
producers not to theoretical free markets and successful diversification, but to market 
failures, capability constraints, and risk management issues - all of which present 
serious obstacles to beneficial change. In this light, analysis of FLO Fairtrade is used 
to argue that far from being detrimental, Fair Trade might actively contribute to 
diversification by alleviating some of the real world obstacles that otherwise retard 
development. 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Mark Hayes, Adrian Morley, Roberta Sonnino and two anonymous 
referees for taking the time to offer very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. However, the 
author naturally takes full responsibility for the final content, and therefore any contentions or 
inaccuracies that the reader may find within. A further acknowledgement is to the ESRC who provided 
the author with studentship support during the development of this work.  
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Introduction 
As sales of Fair Trade products have grown (FLO 2007) so has the corollary academic 
interest in this phenomenon. Starting with Michael Barratt-Brown’s seminal work 
(1993), the theoretical and empirical understanding of Fair Trade has become 
increasingly sophisticated and it is to this former area that this article hopes to 
contribute. Recently it has been noted that, “At the origins of F[air] T[rade], there is 
the intent of setting up a new regulation framework for commercial exchanges” 
(Becchetti and Huybrechts 2008, p. 735), and it is on this basis that this paper 
interprets Fair Trade as a system of private “governance” that organises the 
production and trade for specific commodity goods. The aim of such governance is to 
increase the benefits of these commercial activities for southern producers; a group 
seen to be marginalised and even exploited by “conventional”2 governance 
arrangements (Barratt Brown 1993; Nicholls and Opal 2005).  
 
Such an interpretation of Fair Trade is grounded in the recognition that far from being 
solely organised by market forces, economies are governed by a variety of power 
networks (Powell 1991; Thorelli 1986; Williamson 1975). Applying these ideas to 
value chains, Gereffi (1995, p. 84) suggests that market governance is just one of five 
ways in which commercial interactions are organised – and are thus only one system 
among many that coordinates the economy. A further nuance sees governance as 
                                                 
2 The term “conventional” highlights the argument that while the debate about Fair Trade is often 
couched in terms of “free trade versus Fair Trade”, this does not represent the policy option available. 
As Barrat Brown (1993) made clear, the very purpose of Fair Trade was to compensate for the effects 
of monopolistic and oligopolistic structures that dominate the commodity sectors. In other terminology, 
Fair Trade essentially seeks to replace “captive” governance, in which a sma ll number of buyers 
capture the function of price giver, with a “relational” form of inter-firm coordination that considers the 
situation of producers in structuring the terms of interaction (Gereffi et al. 1995).  
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operating both externally and internally to value chains (Kaplinsky and Morris 2002, 
p. 31). This is because while quality, price and timing are often controlled from within 
these networks, the rise of “private authority” (Hall and Biersteker 2002) means that 
many other none-state and none-market systems now influence quality standards – as 
well as the labour and environmental conditions under which production takes place 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2002, p. 31). It is into this category of private governance that 
Fair Trade appears to integrate smoothly (as either internal norms of socially 
orientated companies or external regulation and certification for mainstream 
operations), and as such, it is the broad language of governance that will be used in 
this article.  
 
While academic interest in Fair Trade has been as multifaceted as the concept itself, 
work has particularly focused on poverty reduction and developmental impact. This is 
because while Fair Trade goes beyond the governance of labour standards to set 
conditions such as prices, credit arrangements and capacity building3, advocates make 
the specific claim that, “Fair Trade contributes towards sustainable development” 
(F.I.N.E. 2001). While some analysis has been supportive of this position (Le Mare 
2008; Strong 1997), many investigations have uncovered varying degrees of 
divergence between Fair Trade rhetoric and actual outcomes (Fridell 2007; Raynolds 
et al. 2007b; Taylor 2002), and a minority of scholars have offered even more critical 
                                                 
3 More specifically, the generic concept of Fair Trade requires that: producer organisations aim to be 
sustainable and socially just; initial buyers pay prices that cover the cost of sustainable and just 
production; initial buying relations are stable and supportive; credit is provided upfront to assist with 
production; and that inputs are provided and managed in order to develop and expand the capabilities 
of producer groups and their associated communities. Such an interpretation is synthesised from 
summaries provided by Hira and Ferrie (2006, p. 108) and Moore (2004, p. 73), as well as the wider 
literature on Fair Trade theory and practice. 
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conclusions (Moberg 2005; Sick 2008; Smith 2007b). Perhaps the most persistent and 
vocal criticism is that while Fair Trade might be well meaning in its poverty 
alleviation and environmental agenda, it  “retards the diversification of production 
that is fundamentally necessary for the economic advancement of developing 
countries” and, “promotes continued reliance on products that are arguably poor 
prospects in the long-run” (LeClair 2002, p. 957). This view is based on the argument 
that by paying guaranteed minimum and above market prices, Fair Trade governance 
incentivises producers to remain in sectors that offer little long-term opportunity to 
increase value-added. While this theoretical argument was originally made in the 
context of handicrafts (LeClair 2002), it has been continually reproduced (Booth and 
Whetstone 2007; Collier 2008, p. 163) and now applied to the agricultural goods 
(Sidwell 2008) that make up the majority of the Fair Trade market. As is explained 
below, reference to commodity agriculture makes this a particularly powerful critique 
given the decline in the terms of trade vis-à-vis more highly processed and 
manufactured goods. 
 
While only a limited volume of empirical evidence directly informs this discussion, 
there is a large amount of work that deals with the underlying issues as they emerge in 
other contexts. Thus, the approach of this paper is to draw on this wider literature to 
question the argument that Fair Trade will naturally hurt the long-term interests of 
producers, and to propose an alternative approach to evaluation. Based on this wider 
literature, it is argued that despite the need for diversification, current criticism of Fair 
Trade is based on a number of inappropriate assumptions. Firstly, while agriculture is 
unlikely to generate the growth needed to reduce north-south income inequality, this 
does not mean that its important short- and medium-term contributions can be 
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discounted; especially where individual firms and whole countries currently have few 
opportunities to compete effectively in other sectors. 
 
Secondly, the critique of Fair Trade is based on deductive economic reasoning which 
evaluates real life practice against perfect market theory. Such an approach views Fair 
Trade as “interventionist” policy that “distorts” the efficient operation of “perfect 
markets” and retards diversification. However, even a cursory glance at wider 
evidence reveals that, in reality, the policy choice is not between effective perfect 
markets and distorting intervention, but between market failures – empirically proven 
to retard diversification – and some form of compensating intervention (either 
politically or culturally constructed). Furthermore, even when markets do exist, 
theoretical evaluation has ignored two of the most well established barriers to 
producer diversification: the need to manage livelihood risk and uncertainty (versus 
the assumption of perfect information and production decisions isolated from 
consumption requirements); and the degree of capabilities possessed by actors (which 
is ignored when emphasis is placed on incentive structures alone). When these factors 
are considered, the premise of evaluating Fair Trade against perfect market theory 
emerges as inappropriate, and instead it appears more helpful to compare the 
principles of Fair Trade against what actually exists in its absence. In this light, the a 
discussion of FLO Fairtrade4 hypothesises that far from retarding diversification, Fair 
                                                 
4 Where the term “Fair Trade” refers to the generic concept, “Fairtrade” refers to the specific 
interpretation of the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO). Where Fair Trade has been 
applied as internal governance norms by some socially orientated organisations, FLO Fairtrade has 
provided a system of third party governance which offers a specific concretisation of these wider 
principles. It is this latter interpretation that has become the dominant version of Fair Trade in the 
market (by volume), and for this reason it is FLO Fairtrade is concentrated on below. 
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Trade might in fact actively contribute to this essential process by overcoming 
problems of risk and capability deprivation. 
 
The Importance of Diversification and Structural Change: How 
might Fair Trade governance retard development? 
 
One well established facet of development theory is that while fixed or subsidised 
prices, resource transfers, and higher consumption might temporarily raise welfare, 
there is no guarantee that positive outcomes are sustainable5. Instead, poorer 
economies must generate endogenous economic growth by investing current 
resources in expanding value-added and increasing income; an aim that involves two 
processes that are subsequently seen as essential in the generation of sustained 
growth. The first is economic diversification which increases income at the level of 
the individual entrepreneur (Weinberger and Lumpkin 2007). In synthesis from the 
literature, it is suggested that three broad options are available (See Figure 1). 
 
The second process necessary for the sustained generation of economic growth  is 
“structural change”; and this refers to changes in the activities performed by the wider 
economic units (such as the region or country) in which individual producers are 
embedded (Lewis 1954; North 1981, pp. 4-5). Applying the above principles to the 
export sector (the major concern given the export orientation of Fair Trade goods), the 
promotion of higher value, non-traditional exports is widely endorsed as the optimum 
                                                 
5 While the literature debates the short term merits of such policy instruments in a variety of contexts, 
particularly Latin American Import Substitution Industrialisation and East Asian export orientation, a 
general consensus notes that where there are benefits, these are contingent on the development of 
endogenous productivity (Baer 1972, 1984; Bhagwati 1988; Bruton 1998; Noland and Pack 2003; 
Prebisch 1963). 
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strategy to generate endogenous growth (Bruton 1998, p. 920; Gereffi and 
Memedovic 2003)6. In this light, if Fair Trade is retarding the shift from lower to 
higher value producing, there is indeed strong ground on which to question its 
contribution to “sustainable development”. 
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
1. Reorganisation of current activities by either improving 
efficiency or increasing the quality of the final product. 
These changes are often made with the application of 
increasingly advanced technology and improved skills 
(Lall 2001). 
 
2. “Upgrading” in an existing value chain (Gereffi and 
Memedovic 2003) by moving from lower value added 
processes to those with higher returns. 
 
3. Moving away from involvement in low income value 
chains and into higher income alternatives. For example, 
a shift from the lower value agriculture sector into higher 
value manufacturing. 
 
 
 
However, a key question in this debate concerns how these necessities of 
diversification and structural change are best facilitated. After Central State Planning 
and Import Substitution Industrialisation policies lost legitimacy (Bruton 1998) 
mainstream opinion has been divided into two camps: those who emphasise the merits 
of market governance generated through liberalisation (Winters 2003); and those who 
stress the need to “govern the market” (Wade 2005) in order to control the process 
more closely (Chang and Grabel 2004a; Stiglitz and Charlton 2005). The former 
group argue that as market prices reflect the balance between supply and demand they 
                                                 
6 Especially given its contribution to avoiding balance of payment constraints on economic 
development (Thirlwall and Hussain 1982). 
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provide an incentive structure to guide rational actors to the best investment 
opportunities. As a result, interventions in price mechanisms distort incentives and 
lead to suboptimal investment decisions. Conversely, the latter school of thought does 
not consider that free markets always meet the needs of specific groups (communities, 
regions or countries), and thus prefer intervention to ensure that outcomes are pro 
development – and not just pro private financial gain7. 
 
While the literature that debates the transitions seen in many South East Asian 
economies (Bhagwati 1988; Chang 2002; Noland and Pack 2003; Wade 1990) is an 
excellent example of this divided opinion, the same issues emerge in the debate over 
Fair Trade.  Specifically supporters argue that in the absence of other intervention, 
private governance is needed to ensure that poor producers can gain from 
participation in an increasingly globalised economy (Barratt Brown 1993; Oxfam 
2002; Raynolds et al. 2004). Critics of Fair Trade on the other hand argue that poor 
returns are due to oversupply and that as a result, producers must diversify away from 
current sectors to increase standards of living in a sustainable way (LeClair 2002; 
Sidwell 2008). As an extension they claim that the payment of guaranteed minimum 
prices above market rates will blunt the incentives for diversification and thus only 
serve to perpetuate poverty and inequality.  
 
This is a particularly powerful argument when applied to the commodity agricultural 
goods that form the majority of the Fair Trade market, as the real prices of these 
                                                 
7 Numerous authors, starting with Fredrick list in 1941 (Dunkley 2004, p. 51), have made the point that 
the market allocates resources on the basis of private profit and that there is no reason why this private 
financial returns will equate with developmental or social returns (Chang and Grabel 2004b, p. 155; 
Rodrik 2004). 
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goods have been in long-term decline vis-à-vis those of more highly process and 
manufactured exports (Ocampo and Parra 2003; Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). Indeed, 
it has been the discovery of the falling terms of trade that has largely underpinned the 
mainstream policy recommendation that countries shift away from raw and 
agricultural goods and towards more highly processed and preferably manufactured 
exports (Bruton 1998). Based on this assessment, perhaps the most damming criticism 
of Fair Trade is that it perpetuates a structural division of labour  that stands to see the 
rich getting richer and the poor consistently loosing out (Frank 1966; Wallerstein 
1979).  
 
The Importance of Agricultural Development: Investment in 
agriculture is no dead end 
 
While evidence of a decline in the terms of trade is strong, research also validates 
Prebisch’s (1950) explanation that price patterns are defined by market determined 
qualities of a good, and not just its physical characteristics (although the latter does 
clearly inform the former). For example, Schrank (2004) shows that while many East 
Asian countries profited from manufacturing garments, attempts to copy this success 
have often failed. This is because as more countries pursue the same agenda, supply 
rises and international prices fall – a process that scholars have now identified in 
numerous manufacturing sectors (Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001, p. 2; Wood 1997).  
 
Furthermore, while agricultural prices are in long-term decline of about 1% per year, 
this is not continuous or universal, and as a result, some agricultural goods still offer 
more value-added than others (Ocampo and Parra 2003). As in the case of switching 
to horticulture (Weinberger and Lumpkin 2007) these might involve fundamental 
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changes to the physical nature of the product produced. However, other examples 
such as the “Golden Kiwi” show that higher prices can also be engineered through 
appropriate social construction that requires little or no physical change  (Fitter and 
Kaplinsky 2001). A more mixed example might be organic agriculture where 
additional value lies in both social and physical differentiation of the product (Kilian 
et al. 2006; Thompson 1998). Particularly of note in this process has been the 
transition of grades and standards, accompanied by labelling and certification, “from a 
technical instrument to reduce transaction costs in homogeneous commodity markets 
to a strategic instrument of competition in differentiated product markets” (Reardon et 
al. 2001, p. 421). Indeed, it is widely recognised that the rise of both organic and Fair 
Trade items have relied heavily on these methods to differentiate themselves in the 
market place (Tran-Nguyen and Zampetti 2004)8.  
 
What these examples show is that far from being a universally poor option, 
appropriate investment in a dynamic agricultural sector might not only contribute to 
domestic food security (by increasing local food production and reducing reliance on 
volatile international markets), but can also contribute positively to the balance of 
trade. Such an intra-sectoral view might well help to explain the observation that 
while income increases for rural households can be correlated with a decrease in non-
farm activity (Hymer and Resnick 1969), other cases show that appropriate 
investments in agricultural activities can also increase returns (Chuta and Liedholm 
1990; Mellor 1976).   
                                                 
8 Given the self reflexive component of sustainable development there is a reason to deconstruct the 
concentration on supply side structural change and suggest that diversification of northern demand 
should also play a part in building endogenous growth in poorer regions. However, for simplicity, this 
is not an issue that will be addressed here. 
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However, the argument in favour of agricultural investment is more extensive. This is 
because the appropriate development of agriculture (or indeed any sector such as 
handicrafts) offers an opportunity for poorer countries to accumulate general 
capabilities or “agglomerate” the assets needed for sectors that offer categorically 
higher returns (Porter 2000). Indeed, comparisons of economic growth and sectoral 
development show that as poor countries get richer, sectoral production and 
employment become less concentrated and more diversified as the number of non-
traditional exports expands (Imbs and Wacziarg 2003; Klinger and Lederman 2004). 
Such patterns suggest that as returns from traditional activities are invested in 
essential economic assets (such as infrastructure, education, health and knowledge)9, 
involvement in more and more non-traditional activities becomes possible. This 
understanding helps explain why economies that have diversified out of commodity 
exports have only done so after accruing extensive levels of infrastructure, higher 
levels of labour and technical skills and better access to financial resources than those 
that have not (Maizels 2003, p. 176). 
 
In further support of the importance of agricultural investment  it must be also noted 
that while a shift to manufacturing might be a long-term necessity, many countries 
such as those in Africa simply have no such choice in the short- or medium-term 
(Wood 2003; Wood and Mayer 2001). With low levels of human and physical capital 
(not to mention inadequate infrastructure) Africa has little hope of entering 
                                                 
9 Indeed, while the development of infrastructure used to be of prime concern, it is now recognised that 
this is unlikely to be enough (Krueger 1995, p. 23) as education (Borensztein et al. 1998; de Mello 
1997) and health (Anand and Sen 2000; Bhargava et al. 2001; Bloom et al. 2004) all play important 
roles in stimulating productivity. 
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international markets for manufactured goods on a competitive basis. As a result, the 
only currently viable policy option is to invest in commodity sectors as the economic 
engine of further development – very much as South East Asia invested in agriculture 
prior to the subsequent growth of their own manufacturing sectors (Kay 2002).  
 
So strong is this argument that even the World Bank (which has largely ignored the 
importance of agricultural development) has joined other major institutions such as 
the UK Department for International Development (2005) in rediscovering the 
importance of agricultural investment. Indeed, the World Development Report 2008: 
Agriculture for Development  notes that, “The top priority is to generate rural jobs by 
diversifying into labor- intensive (sic) high value agriculture linked to a dynamic rural 
nonfarm sector in secondary towns” (World Bank 2008a, p. 1).  
 
The Case for Fair Trade: The problems with “conventional” 
governance  
 
While agriculture appears central in the process of developing economies, this 
argument still explicitly and implicitly recognises the need for diversification if 
endogenous growth is to rise over time. As a result the important question is how to 
facilitate such change, and the position of Fair Trade critics is that the payment of 
minimum prices will only serve to distort markets and thus corrupt investment 
decisions. However, such a view assumes a choice between suboptimal outcomes 
under Fair Trade and preferential results achieved through deference to perfect market 
organisation – and it is here that analysis based on deductive economic theory is open 
to question.  
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As Polanyi (1985 [1944]) observed, despite the tendency for markets to widen and 
deepen over time, markets cannot be guaranteed to exist, and the completeness of the 
Great Transformation has been consistently questioned  (Granovetter 1985; Inglehart 
and Baker 2000). Indeed, it was noted in 1989 that, “it is now well recognised that 
there are many instances of market failures in more developed economies…[but also 
that] market failure is even more prevalent in L[ess] D[eveloped] C[ountrie]s” 
(Stiglitz 1989, p. 197). Despite the realisation that “information” is the “good” most 
subject to market failure, development policies are still judged against the  
hypothetical outcomes of perfect market models ; a scenario that unrealistically 
assumes free information flows, and as a consequence rather unhelpfully eradicates 
consideration of risk and uncertainty from decision making models. 
 
It is on this basis that the comparison of Fair Trade governance and perfect market 
operation becomes inappropriate, as, “It is well recognized (sic) that, in the 
developing country context, rural households are systematically exposed to market 
imperfections and constraints…and their behavior (sic) cannot be understood without 
reference to the specificity of these failures” (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2006). As a 
consequence, and despite opportunities identified by macro level analysis, what is 
often more important (especially in the case of small farmers) is the level of  
opportunity occurring at the local or meso level– a point first established by Alfred 
Marshall in 1890  and continually revisited by economic geographers and those 
working with the concepts of agglomeration and clustering (Porter 1990). Such a 
focus shows that new firms generate “sequential externalities” (Murphy et al. 1989) as 
they provide upstream markets and downstream suppliers around which other firms 
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can concentrate. However, where forward or backward linkages are missing there are 
no immediate markets where inputs can be purchased and outputs can be sold. This 
situation requires entrepreneurs to take considerable risks, to rely on coordinated 
investment in new supply chains, or in the absence of these interventions, leaves 
economies with serious market failure issues that retard diversification initiatives 
(Rodrik 2004). 
 
To place this theory in the context of Fair Trade, it can be hypothesised that a coffee 
farmer will want to respond to the international price incentives to shift from coffee 
into horticultural output (Weinberger and Lumpkin 2007). However, in the local area 
there are no suppliers of inputs such as seeds or specialist equipment, nor local access 
to exporters dealing with such products. Furthermore, the knowledge required to 
make such investments is also unlikely to be supplied by the market. Thus, despite 
theoretical price incentives, diversification is not a feasible income strategy to a 
rational individual.  
 
This means that while removing Fair Trade governance would sharpen “distress-
push” incentives for actors to diversify away from current activities (as price supports 
disappear), there is no guarantee that other “demand-pull” factors will exist in the 
local economy10. Such a situation is problematic as literature highlights that where 
diversification is facilitated by distress-push incentives it tends to exhibit 
characteristics of a “coping” strategy as new activities are low risk but also unlikely to 
increase income . This is contrasted to diversification for “accumulation” prompted by 
“demand-pull” incentives where new activities offer higher returns, and are of the 
                                                 
10 For an explanation of the difference between distress-push/coping and demand-pull/accumulation 
diversification see Bezemer et al. (2005). 
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type desired by the development theory above. Another point is that while lower 
prices might incentivise labour to leave agriculture for employment in the 
manufacturing sector, again, the realities of the developing world suggest 
humanitarian caution. As Hayes (2008, p. 2958) notes, contrary to the assumptions of 
theoretical models, the developing world is characterised by an excess of labour 
supply and thus Fair Trade exists “where the alternative is not a better employment of 
those assets and skills, but [simply] unemployment”.  
 
These local market failures are not the only barrier identified in wider literature to 
explain why diversification into higher-value activities will not occur even if the 
“prices are right”. This is because while price systems indicate potential returns, all 
economic decisions must also factor in two further considerations: 1) issues of risk 
and uncertainty and; 2) the capabilities that actors have to respond to the theoretical 
opportunities communicated in price incentives.  
 
How Risk Retards Diversification 
 
While all economic decisions involve the management of risk and uncertainty (Knight 
1921) this issue is especially true in the developing world.  Poorer countries suffer 
from natural shocks (such as weather hazards and irregular rainfall), the failure of 
infrastructure, as well as human-made risks including political instability (Fafchamps 
2003; Moschini and Hennessy 2001) and market volatility (Reardon et al. 1992). 
Furthermore the prevalence of market failure in the developing world, and especially 
rural areas (where Fair Trade mostly operates), means that there are limited market 
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based means of managing such negative shocks (Stiglitz 1989)11. As a consequence, 
actors must find alternative methodologies to deal with risks to life and livelihood, 
and while associated strategies are numerous (often being part of cultural institutions), 
one widely used method is livelihood diversification12.  
 
However, research in this area shows that due to the nature of their situation, rural 
producers constantly make trade-offs between “accumulation” and “coping” 
diversification strategies. This is because in reality farmers are not just producers but 
also consumers who must consider the need to smooth household consumption.  This 
realisation informed a non-seperability model of analysis (Yotopoulos and Lau, 1974) 
which, in contrast to standard economic theory, recognises that consumption desires 
directly influence production decisions. Just as all those living next to a casino do not 
place all their savings on red at the first opportunity for a windfall payment, poor 
agriculturalists do not necessarily invest in production that offers the highest 
theoretical return; and this insight has important implications for those arguing that  
diversification should be left to emerge from “individuals voluntarily seizing market 
opportunities” (Sidwell 2008, p. 5).  
 
This is because before potential returns can be secured, new income strategies must be 
rendered profitable through processes of “self discovery”13 and “learning by doing”. 
As a result while some diversification options might bring improved returns, the 
                                                 
11 Specifically, formal insurance markets, and credit – which is often used as a substitute (Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1989) – are largely inaccessible (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990, p. 235). 
12 For examples see: Fafchamps (2003), Kazianga and Udry  (2006), Mordoch and Haley (2002), 
Rischkowsky et al. (2006), Rosenzweig and Stark  (1989). 
13 This theory refers to the process of adapting any exist production processes to any new local 
conditions. For an introduction with empirical examples see Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) 
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possibility of failure, at least for an interim period, is often very real. This is 
particularly relevant to agricultural diversification as the maturity of new crops is 
subject to time- lags as well as the information asymmetry produced by natural 
conditions.  
 
Managing such risk and uncertainly is of course easier where outcomes can be 
guaranteed or insured (Peter 1992; Rodrik 2004). Comparatively, these risk are more 
easily shouldered by those with the capabilities to smooth their consumption in the 
meantime (through savings, access to credit or other social safety nets) and likewise 
by those involved in more stable sectors (Alderman and Paxson 1992). However, the 
irony is that the poorest and thus most in need of profitable diversification are the 
least able to risk such action (Bigsten et al. 2000). This is  a characteristic of “the 
poor” embedded in the theory of “declining marginal utility” and a good explanation 
of  why, “although it may be in their [the poors] long-term benefit to undertake a 
certain investment, short-term insecurity prevents the investment from being 
undertaken” (Ronchi 2000, p. 38). This evidence clearly suggests that while 
appropriate push- incentives are important, it cannot be assumed that they will result in 
profitable diversification by poor producers.  
 
How Capability Constraints Hinder Diversification 
 
Another real life consideration consistently forgotten in the persistent concern to “get 
the prices right” (World Bank 2008a) is the need to have appropriate capabilities in 
order to operationalise these incentives. Despite assumptions, even the most 
(seemingly) simple income strategies require financial, as well as physical, social and 
human capital. While financial capital is obviously unavailable to “poor” producers, 
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the lack of other assets might be even more restrictive given that physical capital, 
social contacts and knowledge often only serve very specific purposes. In a vivid 
illustration it is noted that, “both an egg-beater and an aircraft carrier enter into the 
American national accounts as little bits of physical capital, and yet they are not 
interchangeable” (Putnam 2001, p. 117). In the same way, the physical capital used to 
grow coffee is not interchangeable with that needed to produce horticultural products 
(Smith 2007b, p. 94). This lack of substitutability is equally true of social capital 
(Putnam 2001), and the same point must be made about certain types of human 
capital; knowing how to use an egg-beater does not qualify you to control an aircraft 
carrier anymore than knowing how to grow coffee helps you understand the process 
of roasting your own.   
 
Furthermore, the transfer of knowledge interconnected with technology is often 
“tacit” (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003), and thus cannot be easily codified, passed on or 
applied to new contexts (Evenson and Westphal 1995; Lall 2000). As Zehner (2002, 
p. 15) points out in his critique of Fair Trade, the recognition of social learning 
mechanisms as both “enablers” or “barriers” to diversification is of critical 
importance (See: Conley and Udry 2001). However, while Zehner contradicts the 
evidence by arguing that Fair Trade fails to recognise this (discussed below), he offers 
no reason why such information will flow better in a world where Fair Trade is 
absent.  
 
These factors are further well established reasons why poverty levels are strongly 
correlated with a decreasing propensity to embark upon accumulative diversification 
strategies (Dercon and Krishnan 1996; Gilbert 1988; Kazianga and Udry 2006). In the 
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light of these economic realities, emphasis on “push” price incentives is simply not 
adequate to evaluate or develop methodologies for promoting diversification. Instead, 
this evidence suggests that the realistic and immediate alternative for many of those 
currently supported by Fair Trade is not effective markets and beneficial 
diversification, but market failure, exposure to risk, capability constrains and static 
economic structures. This argument is summarised in Figure 2 which illustrates the 
differences between theoretical expectations and real world conditions. 
 
 Perfect Market Theory Realities of the Rural 
Developing World 
Markets for all goods complete and 
perfect 
Significant market failures 
with missing demand-pull 
opportunities and incentives 
Perfect information for all actors across 
time and space 
Information subject to largest 
market failures, patchy and 
often non-existent 
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
Capabilities to respond to incentives not 
considered 
Poor communities defined by 
a lack of financial, physical, 
human and social capital 
Po
lic
y 
Su
gg
es
tio
n  
Defer to market incentives to promote 
accumulating diversification strategies 
 
Compensating intervention 
necessary to manage risk and 
develop capabilities to 
diversify 
 
 
 
 
On this basis, the important question is not how Fair Trade compares to theoretical 
models, but if and how it compensates for the real world problems faced by poor 
producers. It is this question that is explored below using the example of FLO 
Fairtrade. 
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Building a Theoretical Case for Fair Trade: How FLO 
governance might influence real life diversification options 
 
While it is suggested above that the broad concept of Fair Trade can be defined by a 
number of generic norms of operation (See Footnote 3), FLO Fairtrade governance 
interprets such norms in more specific practices and rules. These interpretations are 
summarised in Figure 3.  
 
Realities of the Rural 
Developing World 
Response of Fair Trade  FLO Fairtrade 
Governance 
Significant market failures 
with missing demand-pull 
opportunities and 
incentives 
Flows of information that 
identify value added 
opportunities 
Flows of information that 
identify value added 
opportunities through 
Producer Business Unit  
Information subject to 
largest market failures, 
patchy and often non-
existent. General 
instability of life 
Long-term trading relations 
and stable ordering 
patterns. Up front credit 
provided on request 
Encourages long-term 
contracts and indication of 
demand through letters of 
intent. Up front credit 
provided on request 
Price to cover sustainable 
livelihoods. Developmental 
investment in producer 
operations and 
communities 
Minimum above market 
prices and Social Premium 
paid for investment in 
business development.  
 
Poor communities defined 
by a lack of financial, 
physical, human and 
social capital 
Participation builds networks 
 
 
Figure 3 also summarises the argument, made in more detail below, that these norms 
compensate for some of the real world problems faced by rural producers; specifically 
by reducing risk and uncertainty, and alleviating the capacity constraints that 
otherwise prevent accumulative diversification. Having said this, the argument by no 
means seeks to characterise FLO Fairtrade as either perfect or a complete response to 
diversification barriers; particularly as its governance does little to directly build other 
opportunities in the local environment. Another important point is that the argument 
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here relates only to small farmers and that the certification of larger plantation style 
production is likely to operate very differently. 
 
FLO Fairtrade Reduces Risk and Builds Producer Capacity  
 
While the FLO Fairtrade minimum price system returns higher income vis-à-vis 
market organisation (Becchetti and Costantino 2008; Utting-Chamorro 2005), 
guaranteed prices, up front credit and stable relationships reduce information 
asymmetry and the uncertainty it creates (Milford 2004, p. 59; Utting-Chamorro 2005, 
p. 592). For example, Bacon (2005, p. 506) notes that “Farmers selling to a 
cooperative connected only to conventional markets are four times more likely to 
perceive a risk of losing the title to their land due to low coffee prices than members 
of cooperatives connected to alternative coffee markets”. Indeed, even where financial 
gains have been modest the contribution to stability has still been significant and 
highly valued by producers (Jaffee 2007).  
 
Perhaps the most important contribution of FLO Fairtrade (DFID 2000; Utting-
Chamorro 2005) is the payment of a Social Premium that is invested in expanding the 
human and physical capital of both businesses and the wider community. While 
investment options are chosen through local democratic decisions, spending is 
directed by FLO governance (FLO 2006a, pp. 9-10). Funds can be used for credit 
schemes, the expansion of business infrastructure as well as business development 
and training. Such capacity improvements are well documented in impact studies 
which show the development of credit schemes (Doherty and Tranchell 2005, pp. 
173-174; Milford 2004, p. 53), the extension of physical infrastructure, such as roads 
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(Fairtrade Foundation 2004), equipment for weighing and measuring (Parrish et al. 
2005, p. 184), and improving quality of output (Reynolds et al. 2002), pest and 
disease control (Fairtrade Foundation 2004), as well as general increases in 
technological and mechanical application (Parrish et al. 2005, p. 184; Pérezgrovas and 
Cervantes 2002; Taylor 2002)14. It is also important to note that FLO set up a 
Producer Business Unit in 2005, “to provide Fairtrade-certified producers all the 
information they need to strengthen their businesses and seize new market 
opportunities” (FLO 2006b). If this is being operationalised in an adequate way, while 
FLO might not actively build other livelihood options, it does help to render currently 
available options more viable and accessible to certified producer groups.  
 
On education, FLO recommends that the Social Premium be used to fund, “training 
courses in basic education; in professional skills (computer use, tailoring, carpentry, 
driving, management of small business for example)” as well as “practical skills for 
family and community service (healthcare, child care, nutrition)” (FLO 2006a, pp. 9-
10). On this point FLO Fairtrade can be seen to contribute to the wider process of 
structural change as it encourages the supply of education so important in developing 
economic capacity (Anand and Sen 2000). Indeed, the development of general 
educational facilities is almost always noted by impact work (Doherty and Tranchell 
2005, p. 170; Moberg 2005, p. 12; Raynolds et al. 2004, p. 1117; Ronchi 2002, pp. 7-
8; Utting-Chamorro 2005, p. 594) as are the positive effects of accumulating business 
skills through “learning by going”. For example, the National Fairtrade Coordinator 
                                                 
14 There is evidence to suggest that cooperatives can provide access to technology for individuals from 
which they would otherwise be isolated (Milford 2004, p. 64). It is also worthy of note that these 
investments have occurred in spite of the theoretical argument that cooperatives have short-term time 
horizons (Porter and Scully 1987). 
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for Dominica in the Windward Islands comments that, “With Fairtrade, small farmers 
have been transformed from marginalised farmers into businessmen” (Fairtrade 
Foundation 2004, p. 1).  
 
FLO Fairtrade Does Not Necessarily Blunt Incentives to Diversify 
 
FLO Fairtrade has certainly contributed to the capacity of local economic actors, but 
this still leaves the argument that while there might be more opportunity for 
accumulative diversification under FLO governance, the payment of higher prices 
will blunt the incentives to carry this out. This is the position adopted by Sidwell 
(2008) as he recognises the need for inputs to help small producers undertake 
diversification, but rejects that minimum prices are necessary or desirable to achieve 
this. Instead, it is proposed that consumers and businesses invest in alternative 
certification schemes that avoid the payment of guaranteed minimum prices, and 
instead work to increase returns by raising product quality. 
 
Such an argument faces two possible responses. The first is to point out that while 
some price increases have been seen under alternative schemes, to date these have 
been lower than those under Fairtrade (Bacon 2005; Raynolds et al. 2007a, p. 155). 
More importantly, being market based these alternatives lack the stability shown to be 
so important in diversification, as well as being weaker on other development inputs 
such as education and the health provision (Raynolds et al. 2007a, pp. 159-160). In 
short, while alternative schemes might be better at providing preferable returns to 
“conventional governance”, they are currently inferior to Fairtrade at developing the 
capacity needed to overcome the barriers to diversification identified above.  
 
 24 
Secondly, there is good ground on which to deconstruct the assumption that minimum 
prices paid within Fairtrade governance will automatically retard incentives for good 
quality. This is because while FLO maintains its own quality standards15, Fairtrade is 
market based in that buyers are free to choose between FLO certified producers. On 
this basis, it would be reasonable to assume that buyers, under pressure from 
subsequent stages in the chain, will seek to maintain their own quality standards and 
thus exert a pressure for quality especially as the market develops (Smith 
Forthcoming). Furthermore, quality is also directly encouraged by FLO governance as 
producers are required to make yearly plans for business development specifically in 
the area of “creating and maintaining good quality” (FLO 2006a, p. 5). This does 
leave the potential for individual farmers to engage in free riding strategies as 
individuals might seek to sell their best quality products in conventional markets 
before offloading inferior goods through Fairtrade co-operatives (Sidwell 2008). 
However, while there is evidence that incentives for increasing quality at the farmer 
level are not always developed (Parrish et al. 2005, p. 182), farmers can still be 
penalised for inadequate product quality, and further incentives to raise quality are 
anticipated with market maturity (Bacon 2005, p. 505).  In Tanzania, cooperatives 
have responded to wider incentives by paying price premiums to farmers for Special 
Grade coffee within the FLO Fairtrade framework (Parrish et al. 2005, p. 182). 
Indeed, professional independent evaluation has shown that the very best coffee 
(marginally speaking) might not come from Fairtrade certified producers, in general 
                                                 
15 For an illustrative example see Appendix 1 from the FLO product standards for Bananas produced by 
small farmers’ organisations. 
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Fairtrade is of equal and often better quality than non-certified alternatives (Davids 
and Bolger 2004)16. 
 
Similar to this argument is the suggestion that farmers and cooperatives will also be 
less inclined to leave problematic sectors (LeClair 2002) and instead invest newly 
available resources in intensification; especially where markets and “pull” incentive 
are missing (above)17. However, an important nuance is that producers are rarely able 
to sell all their output as Fairtrade certified (Jaffee 2007; Moberg 2005, p. 10). This is 
largely interpreted as a drawback of the system and is certainly the opposite of what 
many producers would like (Hopkins 2000). However, while minimum prices ensure 
that certified output is welfare enhancing vis-à-vis conventional sales, it can be argued 
that some such limit is beneficial. This is because while higher returns from some 
percentage of outputs will help alleviate capability constrains, market incentives will 
still operate for the rest of the output.  
 
Indeed, analysis of the incentive systems used by the Chinese state during the 
liberalisation of agriculture shows that it was a mix of fixed and market prices (Qian 
et al. 2002) that provided the backdrop to significant expansion, increased efficiency, 
and concrete welfare gains (Bramall 2000; Oi 1995; Ravallion and Chen 2007). The 
                                                 
16 A third response would be to question the assumption that consumers of Fair Trade care only about 
the physical component of the products. Instead, as some consumer clearly show a preference for 
socially embedded qualities which should be considered equally in evaluating the utility derived from 
consumption (Golding and Peattie 2005; Mann 2008). In this way, analysis could also consider 
diversification of consumption patterns in evaluating the potential of any given export. 
17 Indeed, there is evidence from the craft (and thus non-FLO certified) sector that because producer 
groups depend on northern specific organisations for access to international markets, they have not 
engaged in diversification strategies (Traidcraft Market Access Centre 2005, 28, cited by Le Mare 
2008, p. 1928). 
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same argument can be made in the case of quality, and while additional inputs from 
Fairtrade might not be invested to increase the quality of certified goods, these funds 
are then available for the improvement of other product lines18.  
 
This argument is contested by Zehner (2002, p. 15) who suggests that if “distortions” 
are only minimal, then the added resources will not be of sufficient volume to make 
effective contributions to business development. However, this criticism misses the 
point that higher prices are not the primary element of FLO Fairtrade. As noted 
above, there are other inputs offered by the governance framework to overcome the 
problems of conventional organisation. Going further, Haynes (2006) notes that 
another non-financial benefit is the competition-enhancing and market-strengthening 
role that investments can play in building the local economy – and in this way 
Fairtrade should not be seen as replacing market governance, but instead building 
markets institutions and hence closing the gap between empirical reality and idealised 
market conditions.  
 
Another factor missed by critics is the efforts taken by FLO to actively promote 
diversification through their governance systems. Recognising the problems of mono-
cropping, two of the FLO product standards now suggest that: 
 
“The producer organisation shows efforts to also promote the marketing of other 
crops in the farmer’s rotation pattern in order to decrease economic dependency on 
                                                 
18 On this basis it would be recommended that the FLO try to influence demand so as to balance the 
distribution of benefits between producer groups. This would also reduce the risk of some organisations 
becoming reliant on Fair Trade while others remain excluded. One possibility for such management 
would be to set maximum Fairtrade returns per head of certified groups after which the remaining 
output would have to be sold conventionally. 
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one single crop and to give the farmers additional sources of income. Also other 
alternative sources of income (e.g. production of biological pest control formulations) 
shall be explored”19. 
 
This last possibility highlights a move away from agricultural commodities and into 
the sale of processed agricultural inputs that can have tremendous multiplier effects 
for both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. While this regulation does not 
currently emphasise that diversification should promote higher incomes or local food 
security20, development of such policy could be key in cons tructing “hubs” around 
which new markets and clusters can develop. This policy would be even more 
resistant to critique if Fairtrade was to promote the facilitation of new market 
opportunities by buyers and retailers currently benefiting from the use of the FLO 
mark. 
 
As this argument is grounded in policy analysis, future research is clearly necessary to 
investigate what concrete effect such policy has had in facilitating real life change. 
Indeed, such an imperative applies to the entirety of the theoretical position put 
forward in this paper. Having said this, and despite the evidence base being small, 
there is some volume of empirical evidence that FLO certified producers have 
undertaken diversification that is potentially of the accumulative variety (and fits into 
one of the three classification suggested in Figure 1). According to a recent summary 
of literature concerned with development impact, it was noted that Fair Trade is, 
“contributing to the capacity to improve and diversify livelihoods” (Le Mare 2008, p. 
                                                 
19 See the criteria stated under “Economic Development” and “Process Requirements” (FLO 2008a, 
2008b). 
20 Local food security is of course an issue that cannot be ignored by the development agenda.  
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1922). Returning to the specific case of the FLO, many certified cooperatives have 
invested in efficiency (Ronchi 2006; Taylor 2002) and quality gains (Option 1 in 
Figure 1 above), such as those obtained from installing the cupping facilities noted by 
various studies (Fairtrade Foundation 2007; Raynolds 2002, p. 17; Utting-Chamorro 
2005). Indeed, some commentators suggest that it has been such improvements that 
have allowed producers to compete alongside and within mainstream markets 
(Doherty and Meehan 2006).  
 
FLO Fair trade certified producers have also upgraded through the value chain (Option 
2). For  example, the ISMAM21 coffee cooperative in Chiapas purchased a large 
roasting machine and created the company Mam Maple  through which they now 
market ready-toasted, ground and packaged coffee  (Milford 2004, p. 54)22. In other 
cases, the stability and additiona l resources introduced by Fairtrade have provided the 
opportunity for diversification into other value chains and markets (Option 3). For 
example, ISMAM and UCIRI23 cooperatives in Mexico have diversified into the 
marketing of cocoa, honey and organic preserves (Fridell 2007, p. 188; Milford 2004, 
p. 54)24, while others such as CECOCAFEN 25 (Nicaragua) and ISMAM have invested 
in eco-tourism projects (Milford 2004, p. 54; Utting-Chamorro 2005, p. 592). In the  
same light, numerous groups have moved into organic production, and while some of 
                                                 
21 Indigenas de la Sierra Madre de Motozintla. 
22 It is argued that such a strategy is problematic as coffee is best roasted and packed closer to retailers 
(Scholer 2004). However, with modern technologies both the problems of perishability and matching 
products to consumer demands are far from insurmountable. 
23 Unión de Comunidades Indígenas de la Región del Istmo . 
24 Where some areas have developed specialisations in certain crops due to political factors, this has 
often overlapped with, or been the result of, ecological limitations on what can be successfully grown 
(Fridell 2007, p. 176). This is clearly important in judging the viability of diversification options.   
25 La Central de Cooperativas Cafetaleras del Norte. 
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these experiments have not proved successful (Smith 2007b), others have produced 
financial as well as environmental and health benefits (Bacon 2005; Taylor 2002, p. 
14). Furthermore, change has even included the expansion of livelihoods beyond 
agriculture to include artisan crafts such as soap making (Doherty and Tranchell 2005, 
p. 170; Ronchi 2003) and even industrial clothes production (Fridell 2007, p. 188; 
Smith 2007a)26. 
 
In perhaps the most inspiring developments, institutions involved with Fair trade have 
made significant contributions to developing other tertiary sectors where higher levels 
of skills and capabilities are required. For example, UCIRI have worked with other 
independent organisations to play a key role in the formation of CERTIMEX27, an 
ecological certification system; Comercio Justo, a Mexican Fair Trade regulatory 
body (Smith 2008); and Integradora Agromercados, a marketing company for Fair 
Trade coffee and other products such as amaranth, maguey, corn and beans (Jaffee et 
al. 2004, pp. 184-186; Taylor 2002, p. 8; VanderHoff Boersma 2003 cited in Fridell: 
188). While these examples are limited they suggest that either extraneous variables 
must be found to explain how these groups have overcome the propensity of Fairtrade 
to retard diversification, or that, perhaps, no such tendency is inherent within the 
system.  
 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that the attempt to move into clothing manufacture was ultimately unsuccessful. 
However, research show that this failure was due to the inadequacy of support offered by northern 
partners and not the principles of Fair Trade themselves (Smith 2007a). 
27 Certificadora Mexicana de Productos y Procesos Ecológicos. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to interrogate the increasingly popular argument that the 
payment of Fair Trade minimum prices retards economic diversification and structural 
change. The first stage of this response was to underline the necessity for such 
change. Sus tainable development will require local economies to capture more value-
added as only endogenous growth coupled with local redistribution can reduce local 
poverty and redress broader inequalities. However, in order to shift away from current 
structures, economies must build capacity to operate effectively in new sectors by 
undertaking incremental diversification and increasing the amount of value-added 
captured by current commercial activity. 
 
With this in mind the question becomes how best to facilitate this diversification, and 
the primary argument has been that while perfect free market organisation might be 
the ideal way to promote change, such a policy option is simply unavailable. Very 
often markets do not exist at all, and where markets are more complete, evidence 
shows that “poor” producers are unlikely to be able to respond to market incentives. 
This is because while they are constantly forced to forgo profitable investments to 
manage risk, the options for new livelihoods are further restricted by a fundamental 
lack of capacity inherent in the condition of poverty.  
 
On this basis it was then suggested that in place of viewing Fair Trade as an inferior 
alternative to perfect free markets, a more appropriate consideration is how such 
governance improves diversification opportunities vis-à-vis these real world 
alternatives. Building on the problems identified, and using the example of FLO 
Fairtrade, it was argued that such governance contributes stability while at the same 
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time alleviating the capacity constraints that normally hold back diversification by the 
poor (as summarised in Figure 3). Furthermore, while a large part of the critique is 
based on the deductive argument that minimum prices will retard quality 
improvements and promote intensification, it was suggested that empirical experience 
indicates this is not necessarily the case – particularly where governance stresses the 
need to diversify.  
 
It is important to note that these diversification requirements are only included in two 
product specific standards and could perhaps be extended to all product categories 
where problems of oversupply are significant 28. Another factor for consideration will 
be how these standards are audited and enforced, as well as whether capacity building 
inputs are adequate to facilitate such moves. Indeed many argue that FLO Fairtrade is 
a weaker version of the Fair Trade concept (Low and Davenport 2005; Smith 2007b), 
and asking how the development impact of standards can be intensified might be an 
important part of FLO’s future. One component of this could be to ask how buyers 
and retailers who benefit from using the FLO Certification mark could take more 
responsibility for providing alternative production strategies for impoverished 
communities.  
 
Finally, it must be noted that the theoretical position elaborated above has only 
considered small producer organisations and has not discussed the issue with 
reference to plantation certification. In this context, FLO governance is likely to 
improve working conditions and build the capabilities of local populations, but in the 
absence of other employment options, the contribution to diversification is likely to be 
                                                 
28 This would of course need to be balanced by softening such standards where local and international 
conditions reduce such options. Another nuance would be to encourage producer to contribute to 
domestic food security where this is appropriate. 
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less immediate – and the question to what extent Fair Trade governance can, or 
should, facilitate diversification by plantations is another issue in need of urgent 
consideration.   
 
Despite these limitations, there are serious questions to be asked of the standard 
deductive argument that Fair Trade will necessarily retard diversification and 
structural change. Instead of continuing to compare such governance to idealised 
perfect market models, it is suggested that commentators evaluate Fair Trade against 
the real alternatives open to producers. On this basis it is suggested that, far from 
retarding diversification and structural change, Fair Trade might in fact contribute 
valuable inputs to facilitating these essential processes. However, the case made 
above has been one largely grounded in wider literature and theory, and it is essential 
that increasing amounts of hard and statistically representative evidence are gathered 
on this issue – a responsibility that certainly falls on the shoulders of institutions 
arguing that Fair Trade governance contributes to the aims of sustainable 
development29.
                                                 
29 Specifically it is suggested that FLO (who set standards) and FLO-CERT GmbH (who audit 
producers) collaborate to integrate a significantly intensified program of research as part of their 
auditing operations. 
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